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an absolute target shortfall ordering, which, under constancy of pop-
ulation size and total income, implies the Lorenz and Cowell-Ebert
complaint orderings. Under the same restrictions, one distribution
dominates the other by this ordering if and only if the dominated dis-
tribution can be obtained from the dominant one by a sequence of
rank preserving progressive transfers, where each transfer is shared
equally by all persons poorer than the donor of the transfer. The rela-
tionship of the ordering with the absolute deprivation and diﬀerential
orderings, and its consistency with ranking of distributions by absolute
target shortfall indices are explored. Well-known inequality indices like
the absolute Gini index and the standard deviation are interpreted as
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
It is often argued that attitudes such as envy and deprivation are impor-
tant components of individual judgments so far as distributive justice is
concerned. There is also a view that social status of an individual - approx-
imated by his position on the social hierarchy - plays an important role in
the determination of his well-being (see, for example, Weiss and Fershtman,
1998).
The notion of individual deprivation originating in the works of Runci-
man (1966) precisely accommodates these views making the individual as-
sessment of a given social state depend on his situation compared with those
of persons more favourably treated than him. The deprivation proﬁle, which
indicates the level of deprivation felt by each individual, constitutes the ba-
sis of social judgement. Sen (1976), who introduced the idea of deprivation
into the income distribution literature, posited that an individual’s level of
deprivation is an increasing function of the number of persons who are bet-
ter oﬀ than him in the income scale. Most of the subsequent researchers
assumed that individual deprivation of a person is simply the sum - possibly
normalized in a suitable way - of the income gaps between all individuals
richer than him and the individual himself (see, for example, Yitzhaki, 1979,
Hey and Lambert, 1980, Kakwani, 1984, Chakravarty, 1997, Chakravarty
and Mukherjee, 1999, and Chakravarty and Moyes, 2003).1 Temkin (1986,
1997) argued that we may view inequality as an aggregate of complaints of
diﬀerent individuals located at disadvantaged positions in the income distri-
bution. Temkin considered a number of possibilities of which a major case is
that the highest income is the same reference point for all, and everyone, but
the person with the highest income, has a legitimate complaint. Cowell and
Ebert (2002) used this structure to derive a new class of inequality indices
and an inequality ordering.
In this paper we adopt a view which is similar in spirit to the above
notions of value judgements, but in a diﬀerent structure. We assume that,
in a n-person society, any person in subgroup i of persons with i lowest
incomes regards the subgroup highest income as his target income. The
diﬀerence between this target income and his own income is a measure of
his absolute target shortfall in the subgroup. This notion of target shortfall
formally resembles the individuals’ poverty gap in the subgroup, where the
poverty line is set equal to the targeted income. These target shortfalls of
1An axiomatic characterization of individual deprivation in such a framework was de-
veloped by Ebert and Moyes (2000).
2diﬀerent individuals in diﬀerent subgroups form the basis of our distributive
justice in the current context. Using this framework we develop an ordering
which we refer to as the absolute target shortfall ordering, because it satisﬁes
absolute scale invariance condition in the sense that it does not alter under
equal absolute changes in all incomes.
Clearly, while the Cowell-Ebert ordering (Cowell-Ebert, 2002) is based
on diﬀerences of individual incomes from the highest income, the target
shortfall ordering relies on diﬀerences from subgroups’ highest incomes.
For two distributions of a given total income over a given population size,
this ordering implies but is not implied by the well-known Lorenz ordering
and the Cowell-Ebert complaint ordering. It is also diﬀerent from the abso-
lute deprivation ordering which is based on individual absolute deprivations.
We further demonstrate, under constancy of total income and population
size, that if one distribution dominates the other by the absolute target
shortfall criterion, then the latter can be obtained from the former by a
sequence of rank preserving progressive transfers, where the nature of a
transfer is such that each person poorer than the donor of the transfer gets
an equal share of it. The converse is also true. We also identify the class of
absolute target shortfall indices that implies and is implied by the ordering.
It is shown explicitly that well-known indices like the absolute Gini index
and the standard deviation are coherent with the absolute target shortfall
ordering.
The paper is organized as follows. The absolute target shortfall order-
ing, its relationship with the absolute diﬀerential, Lorenz, absolute depri-
vation and Cowell-Ebert complaint orderings, its equivalent redistributive
mechanism, its function in ranking distributions by absolute target shortfall
indices and examples of such indices are presented in Section 2. Section 3
explores the possibility of a relative target shorfall ordering, which remains
unchanged under equi-proportionate variations in all incomes. Section 4
concludes.
2 The Absolute Target Shortfall Ordering and Its
Implications
For a population of size n, the typical income distribution is given by a
vector x =( x1,x 2,...,x n), where xi ≥ 0 i st h ei n c o m eo fp e r s o ni.T h e
distribution x is an element of Dn, the nonnegative orthant of the Euclidean
n-space Rn with the origin deleted. By deleting origin from the domain we
ensure that there is at least one person with positive income. The set of all
3possible income distributions is D =
S
n∈N Dn,w h e r eN is the set of natural
numbers. Throughout the paper we will adopt the following notation. For
any function f : D −→ R1 the restiction f on Dn is denoted by fn. When we
say that a function f : D −→ R1 satisﬁes some properties, we mean that all
restrictions fn of f satisfy them. For all n ∈ N, x ∈ Dn,l e tλ(x),o rλ, bethe
mean of x. By our assumption λ > 0. All income distributions are assumed
to be illfare ranked, that is, for all n ∈ N, x ∈ Dn, x1 ≤ x2 ≤ ... ≤ xn.S i n c e
xi’s are ordered, any kind of change in xi will have to be rank preserving.
For all n ∈ N, x ∈ Dn, the subgroup of the population with i lowest incomes,
{x1,x 2,...,x i},i nx is Si = {1,2,...,i}. For n =1 , the concept of inequality
is vacuous. We, therefore, assume that n ≥ 2.
Any person j in subgroup Si may suﬀer from depression on ﬁnding that
his income is lower than xi and regard xi as his targeted income. There-
fore, we can consider the normalized gap (xi − xj)/n as a measure of j’s
target shortfall in Si. We will see that this normalized diﬀerence has sev-
eral advantages including poverty interpretation, satisfaction of population
replication principle and convenient role in interpreting inequality indices as
target shortfall indices.




n is the aggregate
target shortfall of individuals in subgroup Si.
Clearly, some of the shortfalls xi − xj may be zero. If xi is taken
as the poverty line in Si,t h e nxi − xj is individual j’s poverty gap and Pi
j=1 (xi − xj) gives us the total amount of money necessary to put the
persons in Si at the poverty line itself. Note that here i
n is the headcount





i is the average poverty gap of the poor, when xi is the
poverty line. Thus, t(x,Si) is the product of these two indicators of poverty.
The following are some of the properties possessed by the aggregate index
t(x,Si).
1. It is independent of the incomes higher than xi. This property reﬂects
the importance of the reference group Si.W h e nj ∈ Si, his targeted
income is in the subvector of x that corresponds to Si.
2. It is an absolute or translation invariant index, it remains unaltered
under equal absolute changes in all incomes.
3. It is linear homogeneous.
44. A rank preserving reduction in xi reduces t(x,Si).
5. A rank preserving progressive (regressive) transfer from the individual
i, with income xi, to anyone with a lower (higher) income reduces
t(x,Si).
6. A rank preserving progressive transfer between two individuals, i,k ∈
Si, where xj,x k <x i, does not change t(x,Si). Similarly, a rank
preserving progressive transfer between individuals i,k / ∈ Si, does not
change t(x,Si).
7. A rank preserving progressive transfer from anyone richer than i to
someone poorer than i reduces t(x,Si). Likewise, a rank preserving
regressive transfer from anyone poorer than i to someone richer than
i increases t(x,Si).
8. A rank preserving reduction in the income of anybody poorer that i
increases t(x,Si).
9. A rank preserving addition/reduction in any income higher than xi
does not aﬀect the value of t(x,Si).
10. It remains unchanged under replications of the population.
11. It is bounded between zero and
(i−1)xi
n , where the lower bound is at-
tained when there is no feeling of depression in the subgroup, that
is, the income vector corresponding to Si is equal. In contrast, the
maximum value is obtained when for each j<i , the target shortfall
is maximum, that is, everybody except person i has a zero income.
Later in the section we will see how the aggregate target shortfalls of
diﬀerent subgroups can be used in constructing a summary target shortfall
index for the society as a whole. Now, instead of focusing on subgroup Si,
we can concentrate on the whole population and, as before, assume that for
the pair (i,j),p e r s o nj’s depression is measured by xi − xj,w h e r exi ≥ xj.
Then the average of all such depressions in all pairwise comparisons becomes
proportional to the Gini index (Sen, 1973).
When we focus on the entire population (the subgroup Sn), instead of
making pairwise comparisons of incomes, following Temkin (1986, 1993) we
can argue that xn is the reference point for all persons and xn−xi is the size
5of complaint of person i. Cowell and Ebert (2002) characterized a general
class of inequality indices C = C1
S
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Members of the class C decrease under a rank preserving income transfer
from a person to anyone poorer. The relevance of the family C is shown
later in detail.
It thus appears that absolute income diﬀerences can be used for interpret-
ing several inequality indices from diﬀerent perspectives. In the following
we explain their roles more formally for ordering income distributions.
To show how the concept of target shortfall may be used in ranking
alternative distributions of income we introduce:
Deﬁnition 2 :G i v e nx,y ∈ Dn, we say that x dominates y by the absolute
target shortfall ordering, which we write x ºATS y,i f
t(x,Si) ≥ t(y,Si), (2)
for all i =1 ,2,...,nwith > for at least one i.
Thus, for x ºATS y to hold we require that the aggregate target shortfall
of each subgroup of persons with i lowest incomes in x will not be lower than
that in y, and will be higher for at least one subgroup, where i =1 ,2,...,n.
Since ºATS is translation invariant, it is an absolute ordering. We may also
represent the ordering ºATS in terms of the absolute target shortfall curve.






, is a plot of t(y,Si) against i






graphically shows the aggregate target shorfalls t(x,Si)
of the subgroups Si, as i goes from 0 to n,w h e r eS0 =0 . Clearly, for a per-
fectly equal distribution the curve coincides with the horizontal axis. For an





is nondecreasing but nonconstant. Then











and at some places (at least)
strictly above.
The ordering we consider next is more demanding, as it requires com-
parison of pairwise inequalities in two distributions.
6Deﬁnition 4 :G i v e nx,y ∈ Dn, we say that x dominates y by absolute
diﬀerentials, which we write x ºAD y,i f
yi − xi ≥ yi+1 − xi+1, (3)
for all i =1 ,2,...,nwith > for some i.
Since we can rewrite yi − xi ≥ yi+1 − xi+1 as xi+1 − xi ≥ yi+1 − yi,
(3) simply means that diﬀerences between any two consecutive incomes in
nondecreasing order are not less in x than in y a n dw i l lb eh i g h e ri ns o m e
case(s). It was ﬁrst introduced by Marshall et al. (1967) and has been
considered as a suitable inequality criterion by Preston (1990) and Moyes
(1994, 1999).
The following result gives the relationship between ºATS and ºAD .
Theorem 1 : For all x,y ∈ Dn,xºAD y implies x ºATS y,b u tt h e
converse is not true unless n =2 .
Proof:
Suppose x ºATS y, which by deﬁnition is equivalent to:
i X
j=1
(xi − xj) ≥
i X
j=1
(yi − yj), (4)
for all i =1 ,2,...,nwith > for at least one i.G i v e ni,as u ﬃcient condition
for (4) to hold is that every term within brackets on the left hand side is
greater than or equal to the corresponding term on the right hand side. On
decomposition this requirement becomes
(xi − xi−1) ≥ (yi − yi−1),...,(xi − x1) ≥ (yi − y1).
We can rewrite these inequalities as:
(yi−1 − xi−1) ≥ (yi − xi),...,(y1 − x1) ≥ (yi − xi). (5)
Now, a suﬃcient condition for (5) to hold is that:
(y1 − x1) ≥ (y2 − x2) ≥ ... ≥ (yi − xi),
which is implied by x ºAD y.C l e a r l y ,i fas t r i c t> occurs for some i, say i0
in (3), then there will be a strict inequality for i0 in (2).
7To see that the converse is false, whenever n>2, consider the distribu-
tions x =( 1 0 ,20,30,40) and y =( 1 5 ,20,25,40). The we have that x ºATS
y, but not x ºAD y. ¥
We now discuss the relationship between x ºATS y,a n dºL, the Lorenz









for all i =1 ,2,...,nwith > for at least one i<n . Thus, in contrast to the
average subgroup shortfalls that we compare under ºATS, ºL compares the
proportions of the total income enjoyed by the subgroups.
Note that ºL is a relative ordering, it remains unaltered when all incomes
are multiplied by a positive scalar. Thus, while for an absolute ordering
income diﬀerentials are a source of envy, for a relative ordering people’s
deprivations depend on income shares. However, if mean income is ﬁxed,
we do not diﬀerentiate between the two notions.
The following theorem shows that ºATS is a suﬃcient but not a necessary
condition for ºL .




j=1 yj, be arbitrary. Then
x ºATS y implies y ºL x,b u tt h ec o n v e r s ei sn o tt r u eu n l e s sn =2 .
Proof:






The nth inequality in x ºATS y is nxn−
Pn
j=1 xj ≥ nyn−
Pn
j=1 yj, which





In x ºATS y for i = n − 1,w eg e t :
(n − 1)xn−1 − x1 − ... − xn−2 − xn−1 ≥ (n − 1)yn−1 − y1 − ... − yn−2 − yn−1.
(6)
Given xn ≥ yn and n>2, we can add (n − 1)xn ((n − 1)yn) and subtract
xn (yn) from the left hand (right hand) side of (6) to deduce:
(n − 1)(xn−1 + xn) −
n X
j=1




which because of A implies:
(n − 1)(xn−1 + xn) ≥ (n − 1)(yn−1 + yn). (8)














holds for r =1 ,2,3.( F o rr =1equality holds by the assumption). Assume















The (n − k +1 )
th inequality in x ºATS y gives (n − k)xn−k+1−xn−k−...−
x1 ≥ (n − k)yn−k+1 − yn−k − ... − y1 from which we get:











Given A, this implies that:
(n − k +1 )xn−k+1 +
n X
j=n−k+2




Multiplying both sides of (12) by (n − k) and adding the right hand (left
hand) side of the resulting expression to the right hand (left hand) side of
(14), we get:
(n − k +1 )
n X
j=n−k+1











Since 1 ≤ k ≤ n is arbitrary, it follows that y ºL x. I ft h e r ei sa tl e a s to n e
strict inequality in ºATS, t h e r ew i l lb ea tl e a s to n es t r i c ti n e q u a l i t yi nºL.
For instance, if the inequality in (6) is strict, then the inequality in (9) is
strict as well.
T os e et h a tt h er e v e r s ei m p l i c a t i o ni sn o tt r u e ,l e tx =( 1 0 ,20,30,40) and
y =( 1 0 ,24,26,40). Then we have y ºL x but not x ºATS y. ¥
The intuitive reasoning behind why the reverse implication in Theorem
2 is not true can be explained using the above example. We get y from
x by transferring 4 units of income from the second richer person to the
third richer person. In view of equivalence between inequality reduction
due to rank preserving progressive transfer and the Lorenz domination, we
have y ºL x (Kolm, 1969, Atkinson, 1970 and Dasgupta, Sen and Starrett,
1973). But the transfer while reduces the aggregate target shortfall in the
third subgroup increases that in the second subgroup, and, consequently,
the net eﬀect becomes ambiguous. From the proof of Theorem 2 we can
also conclude that under constancy of total income and population size of
distributions x and y,i fx ºATS y holds, then the former becomes at least as
good as the latter by the maximax criterion, that is, maxi {xi} ≥ maxi {yi}.
The Lorenz domination does not seem to be compatible with attitudes
such as envy and resentment, which according to experimental studies, seem
to be important component of individual judgements. The concept of indi-
vidual deprivation developed in the work of Runciman (1966) harmonizes
these views under the assumption that the individual’s feeling of deprivation
arises out of the comparison of his situation with those of better oﬀ persons.






(xj − xi) (17)
measure the absolute deprivation of person i. That is, the magnitude of
absolute deprivation felt by a person is a normalized sum of the diﬀerences
between the situation of better oﬀ persons and his own situation. By deﬁni-
tion the most well-oﬀ person is never deprived and the poorest person suﬀers
from maximum deprivation. ADP (i,x) may be contrasted with the target
10shortfall measure of person i in a subgroup. The latter simply concentrates
on the diﬀerence between the maximum income of the subgroup and the
person’s own income, whereas the former is based on the comparison of his
income with those of the better oﬀ persons in the entire population.
Following Hey and Lambert (1980), Kakwani (1984), Chakravarty (1997)
and Chakravarty and Moyes (2003) we now have the following.
Deﬁnition 5 :F o rx,y ∈ Dn, we will say that x dominates y by the absolute
deprivation criterion, which we write x ºADP y, if:
ADP (i,x) ≥ ADP (i,y), (18)
for all i =1 ,2,...,nwith > for at least one i.
The following theorem shows that ºATS and ºADP are diﬀerent.
Theorem 3 : The orderings ºATS and ºADP are logically independent.
Proof:
To show that the two orderings are logically independent, we need to
demonstrate existence of distributions such that (i) both ºATS and ºADP
hold, (ii) one of them holds but not the other, and (iii) neither holds. The
following table enlists ﬁve such distributions. The presence of ‘1’ means that
the ordering in the corresponding column holds and ‘0’ means it does not.
Table 1
Distributions x ºATS yx ºADP y
x =( 1 0 ,20,30,40), y =( 1 5 ,20,30,35) 11
x =( 1 0 ,20,30,40), y =( 1 5 ,15,30,40) 10
x =( 1 0 ,20,30,40), y =( 1 0 ,20,34,36) 01
x =( 1 0 ,20,30,40), y =( 1 0 ,24,26,40) 00
¥
Theorem 3 says explicitly that the distributive judgements embodied in
the orderings ºATS and ºADP are not the same.
Following Cowell and Ebert (2002) we now have:
11Deﬁnition 6 :F o rx,y ∈ Dn,xexhibits more complaint inequality than y,
which we write x ºC y, if:
i X
j=1
(xn − xj) ≥
i X
j=1
(yn − yj), (19)
for all i =1 ,2,...,n,w i t h> for at least one i.
That is, x ºC y means that the cumulative complaints of the i poorest
person in x are not lower than that in y and will be higher for some i,
i =1 ,2,...,n. Cowell and Ebert (2002) proved that x ºC y is related to
the generalized Lorenz Ordering ºGL.2 F o r m a l l y ,L e m m a6o fC o w e l la n d
Ebert (2002) shows that x ºC y implies and is implied by (y − yn1n) ºGL
(x − xn1n),w h e r e1n is the n−coordinated vector of ones. They also showed
that x ºC y is equivalent to the condition that Cn
² (x) >C n
² (y) for all
Cn
² ∈ C. In our next theorem we show that ºATS subsumes ºC .




j=1 yj, be arbitrary. Then
x ºATS y implies x ºC y,b u tt h ec o n v e r s ei sn o tt r u eu n l e s sn =2 .
Proof:
Suppose x ºC y, which by Lemma 6 of Cowell and Ebert (2002) is same




















for all i =1 ,2,...,n with > for at least one i. Given the equality of total
incomes in x and y,t w os u ﬃcient conditions for (20) to hold are xn ≥ yn and
y ºL x. From the proof of Theorem 2 we know that under the assumption Pn
i=1 xi =
Pn
i=1 yi, x ºATS y implies xn ≥ yn and y ºL x.H e n c ex ºATS y
implies x ºC y.
To see that x ºC y does not imply x ºATS y,l e tx =( 1 0 ,20,30,40)
and y =( 1 0 ,24,26,40).T h e n w e h a v e x ºC y but x ºATS y does not
hold. ¥
2The generalized Lorenz curve of an income distribution is obtained by scaling up its
Lorenz curve by the mean income, and x ºGL y means that the generalized Lorenz curve
of x is nowhere below that of y, and at some places (at least) lies strictly inside, see
Shorrocks (1983).
12From Theorems 2 and 3 it emerges that redistributive principles involving
egalitarian transfers that are compatible with ºL and ºADP respectively will
be inappropriate in the case of ºATS . Therefore, ºATS needs a separate
treatment in this context. For this we introduce:
Deﬁnition 7 :G i v e n x ∈ Dn we say that y is obtained from x by an
impartially favourable transfer if:
yj = xj − δ ≥ yj−1 for for some j>1, where δ > 0,
yk = xk + δ
j−1 for 1 ≤ k ≤ j − 1,
yk = xk for k>j .
That is, an impartially favourable transfer is a rank preserving progres-
sive transfer from some person (j) and it is equally shared by all persons
poorer than him. Since the transfer is from someone to all persons poorer
than him, it is favourable, and since it treats all recipients identically, we
call it impartial as well. Note that in particular, if there are k persons with
the minimum income and the second poorest person is the donor, then the
transfer is shared equally by these k persons only.
The following theorem identiﬁes the type of egalitarian transfer that can
take us from a less equitable distribution to a more equitable one according
to ºATS .




j=1 yj, be arbitrary. Then
the following statements are equivalent:
(a) x ºATS y,
(b) y can be obtained from x through a sequence of impartially favourable
transfers.
Proof:
We verify the theorem in the case where the minimum income is unique,
and there is only one impartially favourable transfer. The proof in the
general case follows similarly. Note that x ºATS y can be simpliﬁed as:





(xj − yj), (21)
for all i =2 ,3,...,nwith > for some i.
13Suppose that (b) holds, that is, y has been obtained from x by an im-
partially favourable transfer of δ units of income from person t (with income













For i = t,









For all i ≥ t +1 ,





(xj − yj)=0 .
Thus we have x ºATS y .
To prove the converse, suppose that x has been transformed into y
through a rank preserving transfer of δ units of income from the person
t, where δ is shared equally by all persons poorer than him except the poor-
est person. Then x ºATS y requires − δ
t−2 = x2 − y2 ≥ x1 − y1 =0 ,a
contradiction!
T h u s ,w eh a v es h o w nt h a t(b) implies (a) and not (b) implies not (a).
Hence (a) and (b) are equivalent. ¥
From the proof of theorem 5 it emerges that if x ºATS y holds under
the conditions stated in the theorem, then the poorest person in y gets some
positive amount of income from someone richer. Therefore, the following
result drops out as an interesting corollary to Theorem 5.




j=1 yj, be arbitrary. Then
x ºATS y implies that mini {yi} > mini {xi}.
That is, under the given conditions stated in Theorem 5, if one distri-
bution dominates the other by the criterion ºATS, then an implied policy
recommendation is similar to the Rawlsian maximin type (Rawls, 1971) that
maximizes the welfare of the worst oﬀ individual.
Corollary 1 does not say anything about the ranking of depressions of
the worst oﬀ individual in diﬀerent subgroups in the concerned distributions.
14In the following theorem we show that one implication of ºATS is that the
depression of the worst oﬀ person in the dominant proﬁle is at least as large
as that in the dominated one for all subgroups and will be higher for at
least one subgroup. The result holds even if the total incomes in the two
situations are diﬀerent.
Theorem 6 :L e t x,y ∈ Dn be arbitrary. Then x ºATS y implies that
xi − x1 ≥ yi − y1 for all i =1 ,2,...,n with > for at least one i. However,
t h ec o n v e r s ei sn o tt r u e .
Proof:
For i =2 ,xºATS y gives:
x2 − x1 ≥ y2 − y1. (22)
For i =3 , we get:
2x3 − x2 − x1 ≥ 2y3 − y2 − y1. (23)
Adding the left hand (right hand) side of (22) with the corresponding side
of (23), we have 2x3 − 2x2 ≥ 2y3 − 2y2, from which it follows that:
x3 − x1 ≥ y3 − y1. (24)
Next, for i =4 , we have:
3x4 − x3 − x2 − x1 ≥ 3y4 − y3 − y2 − y1. (25)
Adding the left hand (right hand) side of (22) with the corresponding side
of (24) and (25), it can be deduced that:
x4 − x1 ≥ y4 − y1. (26)
Continuing this way we get xi −x1 ≥ yi −y1 for all i.I ff o rs o m ei (say i0)
strict inequality occurs in x ºATS y, then xi0 − x1 >y i0 − y1.
To see that the opposite is not true, let x =( 2 0 ,30,40,50,60) and y =
(15,15,35,35,50).T h e nxi−x1 ≥ yi−y1 for all i, with three inequalities be-
ing strict. But x ºATS y does not hold. ¥
Apart from the implications of the absolute target shortfall ordering and
its equivalent redistributive mechanism, it is natural to consider how this or-
dering may be used in ranking distributions unanimously by target shortfall
indices. Let Tn : Dn → R1 be an arbitrary target shorfall index that meets
15symmetry and decreases under an impartially favourable transfer, where
symmetry requires invariance of Tn under any reordering of the incomes.
Thus, symmetry means that anything other than income is irrelevant to the
measurement of target shortfall. An implication of symmetry is that we can
deﬁne target shortfall indices directly on ordered distributions (as we have
done).
We then have:
Theorem 7 :L e tx,y ∈ Dn be arbitrary. Then the following conditions
are equivalent:
(a) x ºATS y
(b) Tn (x) >Tn (y) for all absolute symmetric target shortfall indices Tn :
Dn → R1 that reduce under an impartially favourable transfer.
Proof:
(a) ⇒ (b):Suppose λ(x) ≥ λ(y).D e ﬁne y = y +( λ(x) − λ(y))1n.
Given that ºATS is an absolute ordering, x ºATS y implies x ºATS y.
Since λ(x)=λ(y), by theorem 5, we have Tn (x) >Tn (y) for any index Tn
that decreases whenever there is an impartially favourable transfer. Note
that Tn is symmetric because it is deﬁned on ordered distributions. By
translation invariance of Tn,w eg e tTn (x) >Tn (y).
A similar proof holds if λ(x) < λ(y).







(xi − xj), 2 ≤ i ≤ n.
This index is translation invariant, symmetric and its value decreases under
an impartially favourable transfer. Hence Tn
i (x) >Tn
i (y) for all i,w h i c hi n
turn shows that x ºATS y holds. ¥
Theorem 7 shows that an unanimous ranking of income distributions by
absolute target shortfall indices can be obtained through the comparison of
the distributions by the ordering ºATS .
As an example of a target shortfall index of the type identiﬁed in part


















16For r =1 , Tn







(2(n − i)+1 )xi. (28)
When divided by the mean income it produces the well-known Gini coeﬃ-
cient. On the other hand, for r =2 , Tn












which, when divided by the mean, becomes the coeﬃcient of variation.
Thus, two well-known absolute inequality indices, namely the absolute
Gini index and the standard deviation, can be regarded as absolute target
shortfall indices.
The parameter r in Tn
r is a sensitivity parameter in the sense that an
egalitarian transfer permissible under Theorem 5 decreases the value of Tn
r
by a larger amount as r increases from 2 to plus inﬁnity. For a given r>2,
the reduction in Tn
r due to the transfer will be higher the richer the donor
is.
An alternative of interest arises from a normalization of the average of
exponential transformation of t(x,Si) values:







r and En achieve their minimum value, zero, if and only if the income
distribution is perfectly equal. While Tn
r is linear homogeneous, En is not
so. With respect to transfers, En h a sas i m i l a rb e h a v i o ra sTn
r for a given
r>2.
Theorem 7 has limited applicability in the sense that it can be used for
comparing target shortfalls of two distributions with the same population
size. But often we may be interested in cross population comparisons of
target shortfalls, for instance, of two diﬀerent societies or of the same society
in two periods. In order to do this, we assume that a target shortfall index
T : D → R1 satisﬁes the Principle of Population. Formally, for any n ∈ N,
x ∈ Dn, Tn (x)=Tnm (y),w h e r ey is the m-fold replication of x, m ≥ 2.
Thus, Principle of Population demands invariance of the target shortfall
17index under replications of the population. In other words, this property
says that target shortfall is an average concept.
Note that the target shortfall curve is population replication invariant,










,w h e r ey ∈
Dnm is the m-fold replication of x. Therefore, the following theorem can
now be proved using theorem 7:
Theorem 8 : For arbitrary m,n ∈ N, m,n ≥ 2,l e tx ∈ Dm, y ∈ Dn be
arbitrary. Then the following conditions are equivalent:
(a) The target shorfall curve of x dominates that of y.
(b) Tm (x) >T n (y) for all absolute, symmetric, population replication
invariant target shortfall indices T : D → R1 that reduce under an
impartially favourable transfer.
Theorem 8 thus shows how ºATS can be used for comparing distributions
over diﬀerent population sizes using target shortfall indices that fulﬁlt h e
Principle of Population. It may be noted that both Tn
r and En satisfy this
principle.
3 Relative Target Shortfall Ordering
The results developed so far rely on the assumption that a person’s feeling
of depression depends on absolute income gaps. But often people may like
to view depression as arising from relative losses. In such a case the extent
of depression suﬀered by person j in subgroup Si is given by
(xi−xj)
nxj .T h i si s
the relative target shortfall of j in Si.3 Consequently, the aggregate relative






Deﬁnition 8 : Given any two situations x,y ∈ Dn
+, the positive part of Dn,
we say that x dominates y by the relative target shortfall criterion, which we















for all i =1 ,2,...,nwith > for at least one i.
3We assume in this section of the paper that all incomes are positive so that relative
losses are well-deﬁned.
18The next ordering, which parallels (3), is based on relative income dif-
ferentials.
Deﬁnition 9 :F o rx,y ∈ Dn
+, we say that x dominates y by relative dif-







for all i =1 ,2,...,nwith > for at least one i.
That is, ratios between any two consecutive incomes taken in non-decreasing
order must not be higher in y than in x and will be lower in at least one
case (see Marshall et al., 1967, Preston, 1990, and Moyes, 1994, 1997).
We demonstrate below that ºRD is stronger than ºRTS.
Theorem 9 : For all x,y ∈ Dn
+,xºRD y implies x ºRTS y,b u tt h e
converse is not true unless n =2 .
Proof:











for all i =1 ,2,...,n,with > for at least one i.G i v e ni,as u ﬃcient condition
for (33) to hold is that xi
xj ≥
yi









yi−2 ≥ ... ≥ x1
y1, which is implied by x ºRD y.I f a > occurs in x ºRD y,
then there will be some > in ºRTS as well.
To see that the converse is false, for n>2,l e tx =( 1 0 ,20,30,40) and y =
(15,20,25,40). Then x ºRTS y holds but not x ºRD y. ¥
Chakravarty and Moyes (2003) argued that instead of focusing on abso-
lute income diﬀerentials, one may rather conceive deprivation as resulting
from relative income gaps. They deﬁned the relative deprivation of individ-










19Deﬁnition 10 : For any two proﬁles x,y ∈ Dn
+, x is said to be unambigu-
ously more relatively deprived than y, which we write x ºRDP y, if:
RDP (i,x) ≥ RDP (i,y), (35)
for all i =1 ,2,...,n,w i t h> for at least one i.
Ac o m p a r i s o no fºRTS can now be made with ºRDP . Both concentrate
on income ratios, but as we show in the following theorem, they are inde-
pendent. Equivalently, we say that the egalitarian bias implicit in one is not
r e l a t e dt ot h a ti n v o l v e di nt h eo t h e r .
Theorem 10 : The orderings ºRTS and ºRDP are logically independent.
Proof:
As in the case of proof of Theorem 3, the proof requires construction
of examples showing the unambiguity/ambiguity of the two orderings in
alternative comparable cases. The following table, which parallels Table 1,
explicitly demonstrates independence of ºRTS and ºRDP .
Table 2
Distributions x ºRTS yx ºRDP y
x =( 1 0 ,20,30,40), y =( 1 5 ,20,30,35) 11
x =( 2 ,4,6,8), y =( 6 ,6,12,16) 10
x =( 2 ,4,6,8), y =( 4 ,8,14,14) 01
x =( 2 ,4,6,8), y =( 2 ,5,5,8) 00
¥
The ﬁrst two distributions in Table 2 also show that x ºATS y also holds
(see ﬁrst row of Table 1). From the two distributions x and y presented in
the fourth row of Table 2, we can verify that x ºATS y also does not hold.
Next, from the situation in the second row of the above table, we have
x ºRTS y but not x ºATS y. Finally, for x =( 2 ,4,6,8) and y =( 1 ,1,4,6),
we have x ºATS y but not x ºRTS y. These observations lead us to the
following theorem.
Theorem 11 : The orderings ºATS and ºRTS are logically independent.
From Theorem 11, we can conclude that the redistributive operation
underlying ºRTS will be diﬀerent from that in ºATS . That is, an alternative
notion of transfer mechanism which is compatible with ºRTS needs to be
devised.
204C o n c l u s i o n s
Given an income distribution x,t ot h eith highest income xi in x we associate
subgroup Si that consists of all persons whose incomes are less than or equal
to xi and the target shortfall of a person in Si is the gap between xi and
his own income. Building on this, we consider an absolute target shortfall
ordering, which, for a given population size and mean income, implies the
Lorenz and Cowell-Ebert complaint orderings.
A redistributive principle that recommends rank preserving progressive
transfer of income, where all persons poorer than the donor of the transfer
share it equally, has been found to be compatible with this ordering. We
also discussed the relationship of this ordering with absolute diﬀerential and
deprivation orderings, and its role in ranking alternative income distribu-
tions by absolute target shortfall indices. Well-known inequality indices,
like the absolute Gini index and the standard deviation, have been inter-
preted as absolute target shortfall indices. Finally, we brieﬂya n a l y z e ds o m e
properties and implications of a relative counterpart to this ordering.
It may be important to mention that our analysis has been of ordinal
nature. It has been concerned with rankings of distributions from alternative
perspectives. A worthwhile attempt will be to characterize target shortfall
indices. Another line of extension can be the development of a redistributive
principle compatible with the relative target shortfall ordering. We leave
these for future research.
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